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Abstract  
This paper draws on insider accounts from UK Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP) officials to analyse the relationship between evidence and policy making at a 
time of rapid policy development relating to Universal Credit (UC). The paper argues 
that, firstly, that evidence selection within the DWP was constrained by the 
overarching austerity paradigm, which constituted a Zeitgeist and had a significant 
bearing on the evidence selection and translation process, sharpening the focus of 
policy officials and analysts on the primacy of quantitative evidence when advising 
Ministers. Secondly, while methodological preferences (or an ‘evidence hierarchy’) 
impacted on evidence selection, this was not as significant as practitioners’ 
perceived capabilities to handle and develop evidence for policy. These capabilities 
were linked to Departmental structures and constrained by political feasibility. 
Together, these dimensions constituted a significant filtration mechanism 
determining the kinds of evidence that were selected for policy development and 
those omitted, particularly in relation to UC. The paper contributes to debates about 
the contemporary role of evidence in policymaking and the potential of the 
relationship between future evidence production and use. 
Keywords: evidence, policy, policy making, universal credit 
Introduction 
In recent times, much commentary has been made on the role (or deficit) of 
evidence in the formulation of policy. Discussions tend to specifically focus on the 
kinds of evidence that make the grade in terms of their policy utility and those that 
tend to be ignored in the policy maelstrom. The steadily accruing literature 
concerning evidence-based policy making (EBPM) are indicative of these 
developments. Central to the EBPM literature, particularly that which takes a critical 
look at the evidence and policy connection is a fundamental concern over what 
evidence, ideas and knowledge are integrated into the policymaking process.  
With some notable exceptions, (for example, Cameron, et al, 2011; Stevens, 2011; 
Maybin, 2015) what is often missing from accounts of how evidence is or is not used 
by policymakers is a closer consideration of the attitudes, actions and aptitude of 
practitioners at the coal-face of policy development towards evidence utilisation. 
These are personnel that Merton (1945) some time ago referred to as ‘intellectual 
bureaucrats’; officials on the inside of the policy process who exercise advisory and 
technical functions. This paper draws on research with such a group within the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) in the UK at a time of rapid policy 
development in relation to the ambitious rollout of Universal Credit (UC). UC was the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government’s flagship reform to simplify 
the benefits and tax credit systems by introducing the UK’s first single working age 
benefit.  
Page 1 of 17
Cambridge University Press
Journal of Social Policy
For Peer Review
2 
 
Our aim was to garner an insider account of how the policy developed in this context 
shaped the evidence that was used and to understand why this was so. The paper 
argues, firstly, that evidence selection within the DWP was constrained by the 
overarching austerity paradigm, which constituted a Zeitgeist that had a significant 
bearing on the evidence selection and translation process, sharpening the focus of 
policy officials and analysts on the primacy of quantitative, economic data and 
evidence when advising Ministers. Secondly, unlike other studies, which suggest that 
policy makers prefer certain kinds of evidence on a hierarchical basis on the grounds 
of perceived scientific rigour, we found that DWP officials favoured certain kinds of 
evidence based on their own individual capabilities to compile evidence and 
perceptions about what Ministers wanted in the context of departmental team 
structures. We elaborate on these points below. Together, these dimensions 
constituted significant filtration mechanisms (Stevens, 2011) that determined the 
kinds of evidence that were selected for policy development and those that missed 
out. Our findings suggest a more complex process than that depicted by a simplified 
‘evidence hierarchy’ as described in extant literature and the paper raises important 
issues about the contemporary role of evidence in policymaking and the potential of 
the relationship between evidence production and use in the future. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section considers the broad relationship 
between evidence and policy. This is followed by presentation of the methods 
employed in the study. The findings are then presented in three thematic, but in 
many ways overlapping sections: (i) Whether there is an evidence hierarchy within 
the DWP (whereby certain kinds of evidence are favoured due to their perceived 
methodological sophistication); (ii) Reflections on the capability of respondents to 
handle and develop evidence for policy, and, in turn, whether and how Ministers 
understand this; and (iii) Political feasibility, relating  to the kinds of evidence deemed 
pertinent by Ministers and officials in the policy area at a specific point in time 
(Zeitgeist). Based on the findings, our attention turns to the future of policy 
development and the evidence-base for Universal Credit. We strike a note of 
caution, highlighting how the policy apparatus of the DWP is at present potentially 
inhospitable to recent findings which have considered the human and social costs of 
welfare reform. We do, however, offer hints of optimism about the direction of policy 
travel. Finally, some concluding remarks are made about how reforms to the policy 
making process, including the development of criteria for evidence selection and 
use, may be beneficial in the future. 
The Impact of the Policy Apparatus on Evidence  
Emerging from debates in evidence-based medicine, evidence-based policy making 
became a dominant frame for policy formulation after the election of the New Labour 
government in 1997. This was part of a broader ‘modernising agenda’ for 
government (Cabinet Office, 1999; Mulgan, 2005). Cameron and colleagues note 
(2011: 430) that at the heart of this development was a ‘belief that policy making 
needed to move away from the subjective use of anecdote to a more objective, 
dispassionate review of available evidence.’ In recent times a pragmatic turn 
(Pearson, 2010) has emerged in discussions around EBPM. The sense of optimism 
that accompanied the first UK New Labour government’s assertions that it would be 
guided more by ‘evidence’ of ‘what works’ than ‘dogma’ have dissipated (Nutley et al, 
2007; AUTHOR), not least as the complexity of the evidence and policy connection 
became more apparent (AUTHOR). The UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition government (2010-2015) made little pretence of basing policies upon 
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evidence. This was to some extent justified by the prevalence of the narrative of 
‘austerity’ as a game-changing context for the development of policies (see Taylor-
Gooby, 2012; 2016).  
Although austerity still shapes the social policy landscape, EBPM has retained some 
currency within Government. A solid portfolio of guidance from the UK central 
government on the process of ‘evidence informed policy’ (Bochel and Duncan, 2007) 
has been produced. HM Treasury’s Magenta Book (2011) provides guidance to 
policy makers and analysts for the design and management of evaluations of 
government projects, policies, programmes and the delivery (p.7). The updated 
version “shifts emphasis away from the ‘analyst’s manual’ of the previous edition, to 
a broader guidance document aimed at both analysts and policy makers at all levels 
of government, both central and local” (2011: 5). The Magenta Book is a companion 
to HM Treasury’s Green Book (2003), which “constitutes binding guidance” (v) for 
departments and government agencies with regard to the economic appraisal of the 
development of policies and programmes. Appraisal and evaluation (and in particular 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses – p. 4) is a key stage of the ‘ROAMEF’ 
cycle (Rationale, Objectives, Appraisal, Monitoring, Evaluation, Feedback) within 
Westminster policymaking and intended to represent the UK policymaking cycle, 
although in recent years it has become less central to this process.  
 
Despite these attempts to provide guidance for policy makers and government 
analysts (economists, social researchers, statisticians and operational researchers) 
regarding the harnessing and utilisation of evidence, the publications have arguably 
added to, rather than alleviated, this void on the grounds that the guidance is, at 
best, incomplete and highly abstract. For instance, the Cabinet Office (2008) 
framework for international policy comparisons omits the crucial step of ‘how to 
transfer/translate policies’ between contexts and at no stage does the Magenta Book 
consider how policymakers can assimilate knowledge from such evaluations. 
Additionally, very little attention is given to the basic reporting of evidence to Minsters 
except to draw, very briefly, upon Vaughan and Buss’ (1998) tips on reporting social 
science research to busy policy makers. 
 
A key limitation of the EBPM literature concerns, therefore, the relative paucity of 
data that explains how evidence is used by those charged with the task of using it. In 
one of the most enduring studies of the evidence and policy relationship, Weiss 
(1979), highlights how the relationship between evidence and policy can be seen in 
instrumental, in conceptual or in symbolic ways. The ‘instrumental’ version assumes 
that scientific knowledge has a direct, linear impact on policy making; has now 
largely been discredited. The ‘conceptual’ understanding suggests that knowledge 
offers opportunities for policy makers to change the way they conceive of policy 
issues and so in this version evidence filters into decisions over time in an 
‘enlightenment’ capacity. The ‘symbolic’ version is where evidence is harnessed by 
policy makers to justify pre-existing policy stances rather than acting as a guide for 
action.  
This account, although useful, remains abstract. There is, however, an emerging 
body of research which has attempted to consider some of the main mechanisms by 
which research is filtered into and out of the policy process. A common thread of the 
more recent accounts of evidence utilisation is that evidence selection in policy 
making is an unequal competition as the framing of the policy in question often 
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determines the kinds of evidence that are deemed permissible. Liebling et al 
(2017:11) note how:  
research has shown how the politics of knowledge production confound a 
linear conception of the movement of research into policy and 
practiceGovernments seek out research to support a view already taken, 
rather than critically engaging with a wider field of knowledge (some of which 
may contradict or confound political perception). 
Similarly, in their comparative review of diverging tobacco control policies in the UK 
and Japan, Cairney and Yamazaki (2017) note that:  
key actors do not simply respond to new information; they use it as a resource 
to further their aims, to frame policy problems in ways that will generate policy 
makers’ attention, and inform technically and politically feasible solutions that 
policy makers will have the motive and opportunity to select. This remains true 
even if the evidence seems unequivocal  
For Cairney and Yamazaki, the sensitive nature of the policy itself impacts on the 
kinds of evidence that are deemed viable for policy development in the UK and 
Japan. Stevens, (2007a; 2011) has suggested that to understand how evidence is 
translated into policy one must consider a number of filtration processes that render 
evidence selection an unequal competition. Stevens (2007a) notes how in 
contentious areas of policy development, there are often significant socially structural 
as well as politically tactical barriers to evidence use. Citing the examples of 
immigration and drug use, Stevens notes how the direction of policy in the UK in 
both these areas over recent times has been towards restricting these activities. This 
is because those who stand to benefit from ‘liberalising’ the legislation (drug users 
and would-be immigrants or asylum seekers) are often among the least powerful 
members of society. They are also among the groups frequently scapegoated and 
stigmatized for social problems, particularly crime, making political reform less likely 
(see Ford and Lymperopoulou (2016) for a discussion of immigration and crime and 
Seddon (2005) and Stevens (2007b) for the links between drugs and crime). 
Elsewhere research (AUTHOR), has suggested that several, inter-related factors 
broadly shape the process of translating evidence into policy. Firstly, that the 
substantive nature of policy issue or problem determines the kind and extent of 
evidence used. Secondly, agenda setting and policy framing influence the search for 
permissible evidence (Head, 2008). Thirdly, specific filtration processes (Stevens, 
2007a; 2011) are always at play in the relationship between evidence and policy. 
Here, the kinds of evidence that are deemed useful to policy makers tend to survive, 
whereas critical evidence falls by the wayside. Fourthly, following lessons from 
institutionalism, where political institutional arrangements greatly effect policy 
processes and outcomes (Parkhurst, 2016:9) the apparatus for policy design and 
implementation can have a direct bearing on the kinds of evidence used and omitted. 
Fifthly, policy personnel in the form of analysts or policy officials play a decisive role 
in relation to each aspect. 
Despite this emerging literature, there are, as indicated, few studies that have 
directly analysed the routes by which evidence finds its way into policy from the point 
of view of those who facilitate or are responsible for this. One consequence is that 
evidence hierarchies are often used as an explanatory tool to explain the 
preponderance of the use of certain kinds of evidence in policy over others (Nutley, 
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et al., 2013). Our research sought to move beyond such accounts, in order to (i) 
shed light on the dimensions that impact on evidence utilisation; (ii) to better 
understand how evidence is employed in the policy process; and (iii) in so doing, to 
analyse views of evidence utilisation from a user perspective. Although we would 
argue that the five factors identified above are inter-related, for current purposes in 
this paper we investigate (i) to what extent policy itself is a determining feature of 
evidence selection and utilisation, specifically within (dominant) policy frames; and 
(ii) to what extent policy shapes the kinds of evidence that are deemed permissible 
and silences other, potentially valuable contributions. We were particularly interested 
in how the organisational features of the DWP at the time of our research mediated 
the framing of the evidence and how this was influenced by the broader policy 
landscape and times (Zeitgeist). Before turning to the findings from our research, 
below we give a brief account of the (very politicized) policy context in which our 
research was conducted.  
 
Research context  
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) is the UK’s largest administrative 
department and is responsible for pensions, social security benefits and child 
maintenance policy. It oversees employment policy and delivers employment 
services both through contracted provision and through Jobcentre Plus. Three 
workshops were conducted with 75 DWP policymakers and analysts in three of the 
department’s key locations around the UK. Workshop participants were officials and 
analysts (social researchers, statisticians and economists), ranging from middle-
ranking to senior officials and from relatively new entrants to officials of long service. 
Participation in the workshops was voluntary through self-selection, but from their 
everyday roles all participants had an interest in how evidence and policy 
interconnect. The DWP was a compelling location for this case study given that 
between 2004 and 2010 it oversaw an unprecedented growth in commissioned 
evaluations (Legrand, 2012: 330). However, Legrand’s assertion that DWP’s growth 
in research outputs demonstrated an “extraordinary sea change in their use of 
research evidence in policy development and evaluation” (p330) assumes that this 
evidence was actually used in policymaking. During the research period, the DWP 
was engaged in a wider agenda of experimentation with new approaches across 
government, including ‘horizon scanning’, which looks across a spectrum of 
evidence sources to consider how they could shape future policy developments. 
These initiatives represented a continuation of machinery of government changes 
led by the UK Cabinet Office but were also aligned with political imperatives under 
austerity, such as large-scale expenditure cuts to central government departments 
and drives for greater efficiency. Consequently, the workshops took place during a 
time of important organisational change and significant policy change for the DWP.  
The most important aspect of the latter was the policy development of, and 
preparation for, the introduction of Universal Credit (UC). The central aim of UC is to 
‘radically restructure’ the existing benefits and tax systems by merging six benefits 
and tax credits into one single working age benefit, in order to improve incentives to 
work (DWP, 2010). UC was introduced in April 2013 in pathfinder areas (pathfinder 
rather than pilot given that definite national rollout of the policy was already decided), 
with final completion across the UK expected by 2017. These expectations have not 
been met. The reform has attracted much media coverage and criticism, with 
repeated claims that the project had floundered and had been ‘scaled back’ 
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(Wintour, 2013) and more recent revelations about the reality of income loss and the 
winners and losers of the policy (Savage, 2018; BBC, 2016). There have been 
concerns around the financial difficulties for households resulting from the change 
from weekly to monthly payments and financial support for childcare, problems with 
online accessibility, as well as UC’s implications for women, particularly the 
individualisation of benefit conditionality without individualised payment incentives for 
second earners, who are more likely to be women (Gingerbread, 2013; Millar and 
Bennett, 2016;). The National Audit Office has published critical assessments of the 
implementation of UC (2013; 2014) and the government’s own Infrastructure and 
Projects Authority (IPA) recommended a ‘firebreak’ in implementation in early 
January 2018 in order to consider whether the rollout plan remained appropriate. 
The Work and Pensions Select Committee (2018) recently praised the DWP for 
bringing the project ‘back from the brink of complete failure’ but highlighted concerns 
regarding ongoing challenges (p.14) relating to this ambitious policy reform. 
UC is the result of repeated political attempts to address the difficult task of 
simplifying the UK’s complex social security and taxation systems. Early in the first 
governing period of New Labour, incremental change was favoured over more large-
scale overhaul, leading to the introduction of Tax Credits and changes to the benefit 
rules concerning spouses/partners of benefit claimants (Joint Claims for Jobseekers 
Allowance for couples and the New Deal for Partners). Further changes to social 
security entitlement followed in the Welfare Reform Act 2009, increasing 
conditionality for a wider range of individuals. A central actor in the next phase of 
reform was the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) and Iain Duncan Smith, who was, at 
the time of our research, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. The CSJ first 
published its UC blueprint for the report Dynamic Benefits (2009), focusing on (dis-
)incentives to work in the existing social security system, in particular high marginal 
tax rates. Government plans for UC were then set out in the Green Paper 21st 
Century Welfare and, finally, in the White Paper Universal Credit: Welfare that works 
and enshrined in the Coalition Government’s Welfare Reform Act 2012. These 
documents drew on a relatively limited range of evidence and, notably, not upon 
findings from DWP-commissioned evaluations, including those relating to the New 
Deal for Partners or New Deal for Lone Parents in terms of the real-world 
complexities of moving into work and changes to circumstances beyond technocratic 
or rational economic dimensions.  
At the time of the workshops, DWP were still finalising aspects of UC and discussion 
of this important policy change and its affiliated evidence-base pervaded each of the 
workshops. Workshop discussions related to the overall policy development of UC, 
its implementation with HMRC (responsible for the management and collection of tax 
and payment of tax credits,) and with local authorities (who administrate Housing 
Benefit, another payment merged into UC), as well as in relation to DWP-
commissioned evaluations of the policy. Drawing on one of the authors’ research in 
three countries in collaboration with the DWP (AUTHOR), discussion in the first 
workshop largely related to consideration of UC in relation to couples and their 
decision-making in relation to work and benefits and ‘In Work Conditionality’, now 
referred to as ‘In Work Progression’ (IWP). IWP is a critical dimension of UC relating 
to its central aim to incentivise any work1 by extending benefit conditionality to those 
                                                            
1
 Once in work, UC recipients who are below an earnings threshold would be required to increase 
their working hours to the equivalent of a 35 hour week, for example through a combination of 
additional employment, higher hourly wages, increased hours, or an alternative job. 
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in work but still in receipt of benefits. IWP is without precedent internationally, with a 
very limited evidence base (the exception being DWP’s Employment Retention and 
Advancement demonstration project focused on improving job retention and 
progression (Hendra, et al, 2011)). Consequently, there has been a series of DWP-
commissioned IWP pilots to garner what could be termed ‘policy-based evidence’. 
Additionally, the first DWP-commissioned UC evaluation report was published in 
2011, focused on public perceptions of welfare reform and UC (Rotik and Perry, 
2011). This was followed by the first pathfinder evaluation (2013) and estimations of 
UC’s employment impacts based on a limited claimant group in 2% of areas; 
qualitative and cognitive research including ‘laboratory’ experiments utilising random 
assignment (DWP, 2017) (underscoring the dominant role of ‘nudge’ and the 
Behavioural Insights Team in policy post-2010); and evaluations of mixed method 
‘test and learn approaches’ in relation to families. Within this policy context, the 
workshops aimed to tease out policy makers’ and analysts’ understandings of the 
evidence and policy connection.   
Our research was co-produced in consultation with the DWP and resulted in three 
workshops,  the first workshop comprising 10 participants, the second around 25 
participants and the final workshop almost 40 participants. The workshops ranged in 
length from one to two hours. Although there were internal variants, there were 
constants in the subject matter discussed. In each scenario, we presented 
conceptual models based on the EBPM and policy transfer/translation literatures as 
vignettes to stimulate discussion. The key research question posed was: ‘How is 
evidence used, or translated in th  context of contemporary policy making in the 
DWP?’ All workshops were transcribed verbatim and data were analysed 
thematically. The findings are presented thematically in the following three sub-
sections: (i) Evidence hierarchy?; (ii) Capability; and (iii) Political feasibility. 
Findings 
Evidence Hierarchy? 
Reflecting the emergence of evidence-based policy from evidence-based medicine 
(Solesbury, 2000), Pawson (2006:49) highlights how there has been a ‘fairly 
seamless’ adoption from health into other policy areas of a ‘gold standard’ of the 
randomized controlled trial (RCT) (preferably with concealed allocation).  Research 
that is seen to be ‘scientific’ and able to establish causality with strong external 
validity tends towards the summit of the hierarchy, while languishing near the foot 
are studies based on small samples, for example qualitative case studies, as well as 
the professional knowledge and opinion of practitioners and stakeholders. 
In social policy, RCT studies are less common than in health or medicine, for 
example, but the primacy of quantitative evidence exists over other, more qualitative, 
forms. Ultimately, the hierarchy is based on judgements over methodology and the 
perceived ‘scientific credentials’ of the method by the policy maker. Although in our 
research we found evidence of methodological preference similar to a hierarchy of 
evidence, it was not immediately clear that this was about the superiority of one 
method over another. Instead, it seemed to be based more on the skill set of officials 
and what they deemed was practically and politically feasible. In one of our 
workshops officials discussed their experiences of using survey data to guide policy, 
stating that: 
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“Survey data has limitations...Samples can be skewed. Response rates can 
be low. It’s a messy story!”  
The following participant also underlined how because the relationship between 
evidence and policy is ‘messy’ (a point to which we return subsequently) there are 
particular limitations within certain policy areas, such as employment policy: 
“random control trials are at the top of the hierarchy but you run a RCT in a 
recession it will give you a different answer than if there is growth. So in my 
experience sometimes there is a clear direction but sometimes the evidence 
points this way and sometimes points that way. There are lots of examples, 
child poverty, Universal Credit where we do draw on evidence and data but it 
isn’t a straightforward story” 
 
Within UK employment policy, the use of RCTs has been particularly contested, 
largely due to the ethics involved in exposing one group to an intervention at the 
expense of others (this is not the case in other countries, for example Denmark). In 
the UK there have only been two examples of RCTs in employment policy: the Joint 
Retention and Rehabilitation Pilot (Purdon et al, 2006) focused on providing 
interventions to facilitate the return to work of employees on long-term sickness 
absence and, more recently, the Employment Retention and Advancement 
demonstration programme (Hendra et al, 2011), mentioned above. 
The quote below expands on the discussion concerning the roles of varying types of 
evidence in the policy process in respect of administrative (management information) 
data held by the DWP and the complementary role of surveys. It resembles the 
distinction highlighted by Maybin (2015), who drawing on the work of Tenbesel 
(2006) states that policy work involves a variety of knowledges; episteme – rational 
analytical knowledge; phronesis -  the deliberation over values and techne -  the 
knowledge about how to ‘do’ policy work:  
 
“administrative sources are more complete and you might want a survey on 
what views are at the time. We do have some facts. There are lots of 
examples of policies that draw on the data but it is complex. Admin data lacks 
social data. We also have to work with Ministers’ own views. There are some 
facts, such as the decline in pension scheme enrolment but we don’t know 
how effective policies to address this are. Evidence based policy is the ideal 
but it is messy and complicated. That is the challenge. We know what the 
problems are but we can’t for example force people to take out pensions. We 
can set up automatic enrolments, but people may choose to opt out. We do 
try, I like to talk about evidence based policy but the reality is that it messy.” 
 
Similar to Smith and Joyce’s (2012) work on understanding attempts to develop 
evidence-based policy in public health, our participants frequently suggested that 
evidence was ‘messy’ and ‘complex’ and pointed to a role for both quantitative and 
qualitative evidence. However, as the following quote demonstrates, they did not 
necessarily perceive a primacy of quantitative over qualitative evidence, which Smith 
and Joyce (2012) note in their study. 
“qualitative evidence is more important in some aspects than quantitative.” 
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This perhaps suggests that there is the potential for a broad range of evidence 
based on different methodologies to find its way into the policy process. However, 
the next section discusses some of the limitations on this. 
Capability 
In our research the issue of capability related to, on the one hand, participants’ 
individual reflections on their own capabilities in terms of both handling and 
developing evidence and, on the other, their perceptions of Ministers’ capabilities to 
understand research. These were, in turn, impacted by Departmental structures. A 
consistent finding from our study was that the officials we spoke to were buoyed by 
their capacity to be able to harness evidence. At times, however, this seemed at 
odds with academic accounts (e.g. Mulgan, 2005) of what evidence is and can 
achieve in the policy process: 
 
“I think in the academic literature there’s generally a consensus and you can 
work that out pretty quickly. Any analyst in the department, even a junior one 
could be given a job like that, straight out of university you could do something 
like that. I did something on parenting and family structure – in a couple of 
days you can work out what the key findings are on that.”  
This view of capability is commendable but it is also revealing of views of evidence 
and its relationship to policy from the inside. In some ways, this contradicts the 
earlier views of the inherently complex nature of evidence and its associated 
methodologies. The previous quotation was by no means representative of all the 
analysts’ views, in that it points towards a rational, linear policy process where 
evidence exists and can directly be inserted into policy discussion, circumstances 
permitting. Other appreciations from our research (as we shall see) and with other 
literature tend to highlight the complexity of the evidence and policy connection 
(Sanderson, 2009; Smith and Joyce, 2012). For example, in their review of the state 
of the art of meta-analysis, Rosenthal and Di Matteo (2001: 60) demonstrate how in 
nearly every field of research, new findings ‘daily overthrow’ older ones, meaning 
that findings are ‘often confusing and conflicting about central issues of theory and 
practice’. In effect, the more something is researched, the less agreement there is 
and the concept of ‘consensus’ in academic literature is seldom borne out. 
There is, of course, the argument that one would expect to see some confidence and 
optimism about evidence from those invested in trying to design and implement 
policy. Nonetheless, evidence is clearly contingent on a conducive context for its 
use: 
“ours is more a policy/analytical division so the evidence is maybe closer to 
me in terms of how it works in reality. So, there does seem to be more of an 
ongoing conversation around influencing things.” 
Here the capability of evidence use is contingent on officials’ role within the 
organisation – analysts will be ‘closer’ to the evidence than their policy colleagues for 
example and so are committed to its use. The commitment to evidence is, in turn, 
often contingent on stability within teams and divisions. One recurring finding was 
the importance of collective institutional memory on the delivery of evidence for 
policy.  
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“It’s different depending on where in DWP you work. There are different 
structures. In some cases analysts sit alongside the policy teams and work 
together and in other cases it’s more fragmented.” 
 
There is, however, the perennial issue of resourcing, which came to the fore in one 
of our focus groups when discussing how analysts decide what evidence to use.  
 
“I think some of it’s a time issue because realistically there’s not that many of 
us and there’s not a huge amount of time always so it could just be things that 
we know we’ve done internally, or from talking to other people who might 
know things. It would be lovely to trawl the evidence base every time you 
have a question but we can’t do it. Actually, with the In Work Conditionality 
this is one of the better examples because there’s been a bit more time to 
think about things. But often it tends to be what’s the organisational memory 
and things like that.” 
Although, as is clear from the previous section, participants did not necessarily 
subscribe to the primacy of quantitative data over qualitative (even if they felt that 
Ministers did), in the workshops they also expressed concern regarding their lack of 
confidence about mixed methods. This suggests that participants were aware of the 
potential rich picture that could be provided by a broad range of evidence but had 
concerns over their capability to organise this evidence for Ministers.  
A significant weight of evidence to shift perceptions can be difficult to manage and 
has a clear knock-on effect for the feasibility of officials to harness evidence for 
policy. This accords with Rose’s (1991: 24) assertion that in policy transfer there are 
two key standards against which programmes and policies should be judged: 
technical feasibility (‘Is the programme practical?’) and political feasibility (‘Is it 
desirable?’). These two aspects were prominent in our research in relation to 
officials’ perceptions of capability (individual and departmental), but were also 
shaped by a third dimension: the context (or political ‘Zeitgeist’) in which polices 
were being designed and implemented.  
 
Political Feasibility 
“you have the evidence and you have the policy and sometimes the policy 
doesn’t reflect the evidence, whereas how I see it evidence is just one of the 
influences on policy. There’s a whole load of other stuff so just to assess the 
policy on. Is it 100% evidence-based isn’t right because of what I was saying 
about the triangle before – feasibility, political will, there’s legal framework, 
there’s all sorts of things. Some policies will be much more evidence-based 
than others” 
 
The political ‘Zeitgeist’ for the research was the then-Coalition government’s 
overarching programme of austerity and the purported need to drive down public 
spending on social security (predominantly concentrated in the area of working age 
benefits). Taylor-Gooby (2016) illustrates how this era has seen the welfare state 
move from an instrument of social cohesion to one of social division. Taylor-Gooby 
(2016) shows how various reforms since 2010, specifically the increase in value-
added tax (VAT) from 17.5% to 20% and the lowering of income tax ‘shifted the tax 
burden downward’ (p.718), universal VAT being particularly regressive. This context 
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underlined the significance of the role of the economy and economic data 
(AUTHOR), but also calls into question claims that evidence-based policy is non-
dogmatic: 
Some policies will be much more evidence-based than others will be so the 
benefit cap, you could have done that as an evidence based policy and 
looked at what’s the right level analytically or you could have done it onit’s 
ideologically based, that you shouldn’t get more on benefits than you do as a 
medium-earning family.  
 
The significance of the policy Zeitgeist added a further level of complexity in that it 
shaped what kinds of evidence were thought to be feasible, or in other words, 
palatable to Ministers.  A key issue of feasibility related to what analysts perceived 
policy officials and Ministers wanted and would accept as evidence. Here an element 
of gatekeeping could occur: 
 
“There’s also capacity of policymakers – if you have policymakers who  
don’t quite grasp it, it’s quite hard to get across to them the complexity. And 
especially people often want nice clear findings as well so complexity is quite 
hard – I suppose complex findings are quite hard to use when you’re trying to 
design a policy it’s quite hard if you’re told ‘This is all really complex’.” 
 
This quotation reflects a longstanding issue in the evidence and policy literature; the 
extent to which there are two separate communities and how compatible they are 
(e.g Caplan, 1979; Head, 2010). This is an enduring feature of discussions about 
evidence-based policy as clearly in this context, policy makers’ expectations shape 
the kinds of work that analysts do.  
A further key finding from the research was that temporal aspects had a specific 
impact on the feasibility of analyst teams to compile evidence for policy and, in turn, 
this impacted on their appreciations of how they handled the evidence-base. Here 
‘timing’ can relate to both the time-frames in which policy actors are obliged to work, 
but also ‘the times’ in which the policy is being implemented. The latter is better 
thought of as the policy Zeitgeist, which influences the framing of the policy problem 
and shapes the substance of the response. The following quotation neatly 
encapsulates the interplay of these factors, drawing on the example of conditionality 
in the benefit system: 
“Evidence is very much at the heart of it. Evidence, operational feasibility and 
the political. But that depends on other stuff like the economypolicy 
generally evolves, it moves along, you can’t generally see it happening, but 
incrementally every day it’s changing a bit. I think someone said earlier that 
the big policy changes aren’t evidence-based. Maybe the idea isn’t, but the 
implementation is really focused on evidence. The evidence might be that we 
want to do X, but then the evidence comes in and we say ‘How do we achieve 
what we want to achieve?’ I feel fairly positive about how evidence is used 
where I work.”  
 
This point about which kinds of evidence drive policy reveals how it is often not the 
technical kind of number crunching (episteme), but the evidence which maps onto 
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politics and electioneering and ‘playing to the gallery’ (phronesis). As indicated, this 
theme directly influenced perceptions of feasibility and capability but what was most 
noticeable was a trade-off between capability and feasibility. This is also 
demonstrated by the quote below: 
“Universal Creditmy own impression is that we’re only addressing half of the 
policy. There’s no general policy of creating enough jobs in the right places for 
all the ways we are pushing people into the workplace. So UC is about 
making people better off in work and there’s the increasing pension age which 
is dumping pensioners so the way it looks is that we’ll be driving down wages 
because there aren’t enough jobs for people to do. Again that’s the economic 
situation.” 
 
This quote is telling in that it provides both a critique of the policy direction in the 
context of austerity and post-recession, as well highlighting the balancing of ‘winners 
and losers’ of policies when connecting evidence and policy. 
Conclusions 
Unlike other studies that suggest that policy makers have a preference for certain 
kinds of evidence on the grounds of its perceived scientific rigour, in our research we 
found that DWP analysts and policy officials felt that ministers were more persuaded 
by the findings of large-scale, national social surveys than by other kinds of 
evidence. Officials were also more comfortable handling and processing this kind of 
evidence in terms of their own individual technical capabilities. The context of 
departmental team structures also had a bearing on this capability and, furthermore, 
this was also aligned with what officials saw as being politically feasible in relation to 
Ministers’ preferences, which added a layer of complexity into the selection and use 
of evidence. In this way, the policy apparatus was a key determinant of evidence 
use. Our findings are semi-consistent with what has been referred to as the 
hierarchy of evidence in policy making and thus mirror the findings from other studies 
of evidence and policy (Smith and Joyce, 2012).  
Our research also suggested that evidence selection within the DWP was 
constrained by the overarching austerity paradigm, which constituted a Zeitgeist and 
constituted a further significant evidence filtration mechanism. The study fieldwork 
was conducted in the infancy of Universal Credit (UC) which from its outset, has 
generated much media coverage and criticism. Our findings suggest that, despite 
officials’ acknowledgements of the limitations, there was a reliance on numbers and 
what could be ‘objectively’ measured and this sharpened the focus of policy officials 
and analysts on the primacy of quantitative evidence when advising Ministers, in line 
with the capabilities outlined above. As such, austerity as a dominant policy frame 
was a key determining feature of the (non)selection and (non)utilisation of evidence 
by analysts and policy officials in the DWP, manifesting in a preference for 
economic, quantitative data.  
With no clear guidance on how evidence is to be used in policy and with perceptions 
of capability and feasibility seemingly driving evidence use, there is a danger that 
vital, emerging evidence will continue to be obscured or omitted in this process. For 
example, it is unclear how research relating to a Minimum Income Standard required 
for an acceptable living standard covering material needs (Davis et al, 2016) is 
accounted for within the complex emerging picture of recognizable winners and 
losers under UC (Hirsch and Hartfree, 2013). In addition, evidence of the human 
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(rather than purely economic) cost of austerity such as the widespread need for 
foodbanks (Garthwaite, 2016) or the deleterious impact of sanctioning on benefit 
claimants (Patrick, 2014; 2017) have not yet filtered into the policy process. The 
same could be said of other research that challenges the current austerity paradigm2 
(Miller and Bennett, 2017). Yet this research provides clear lessons for policy.  
An Institute for Government (2012) report acknowledged that the DWP “was 
traditionally strong on analysis” (p.19) but that the supply of evidence was a 
secondary issue to that of its demand (pp16-17). To develop effective policies, policy 
makers and analysts need to look beyond the constraints of outputs and outcomes in 
the form of numbers in relation to a specific policy area. While the analysts 
themselves recognized complexity, this tended to be in relation to social research 
methods. In this way, other kinds of complexity are obscured, including the tensions 
of overlapping and often contradictory policy areas, including for different groups of 
recipients under a policy with a wide reach such as UC.  
We do not intend to merely resort to calling for more resources in the form of 
expenditure, but it is essential that government policy makers and analysts have the 
necessary resources and skills to better equip them with the capability to interpret, 
present and translate a b oad range of evidence into policy, including a wealth of 
evidence that already exists. This relates to how policy and analyst teams are 
structured in order to facilitate better utilization of evidence within departments in 
central and local governments (as well as government agencies). It also involves the 
development of criteria for good evidence use, in addition to existing guidance about 
evidence selection. Finally, it also requires better integration of a wider range of 
epistemic communities into the policymaking process through more porous 
boundaries between government and academia.  
The complex and potentially path-breaking context brought to the fore by recent 
political developments and the emerging evidence-base raises many questions. Are 
analysts in DWP still committed to developing robust evidence for policy and, if so, 
how do they achieve this? Will we continue to observe a preference for numbers 
among analysts and policy officials in DWP or will other forms of evidence be 
required, and used? These can only be answered by the practitioners themselves. 
The changing political environment (including Brexit and devolution) may give voice 
to new forms of evidence, but unless more attention is placed on how evidence is 
translated into policy this will continue to be mediated by the technical capacity of 
practitioners, as well as more arbitrary notions of what is considered feasible within 
existing public policy structures. 
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